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Abstract 
Homo sapiens rationalize their species’ uniqueness to justify anthropocentrism and self-
interest towards nonhumans. Research and pedagogical practice such as mandatory 
dissection and animal experimentation, alongside mechanistic and atomistic assumptions 
deeply embedded in science curricula, reinforce the idea that nonhuman animals lack 
moral status. We need to devise and implement holistic, place-based curricula in our 
schools, where ethics are part of the conversation before students use nonhuman animals 
in their learning and research. Synergy and deep ecology can move us from exclusively 
biotic morality toward a more inclusive abiotic morality. 
 
environmental ethics; speciesism; ecocentric pedagogy; philosophy of education; biology 
education 
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the same breath taken by butterfly 
curses the infant caterpillar 
 
feather and leather-bound adorn our plates 
while furry friends are seldom factory farmed 
 
what separates the pampered purr 
from the feline parted from her dissected organs? 
 
Flagging Our Species’ Specialness 
Historically, philosophers, scientists, linguists, politicians, religious leaders and educators have 
distinguished the human species from all others. Self-awareness, tool making, language 
acquisition, ability to feel emotion and pain, and many other rationalizations legitimize that 
special status taken for granted by Homo sapiens, often with the result (whether intentional or 
not) of giving legal and/or moral rights for human exploitation of every other creature that isn’t 
a relatively hairless bipedal primate.  
 
As author Michael Pollan (2013) writes, we are obsessed with identifying the faculties unique to 
us:  
 
One by one, the faculties on which we thought we could stake the flag of our 
specialness science has shown belong to other animals as well. Suffering? 
Reason? Language? Counting? Laughter? Self-consciousness? All have been 
proposed as human monopolies, and all have fallen before science’s deepening 
understanding of the animal brain and behavior…though perhaps an even 
sturdier candidate would be this: humans are the only species that feels 
compelled to identify faculties that it alone possesses. (p. 55–56) 
 
One uniquely human aptitude I would add is our capacity to drastically alter our environment. 
By staking “the flag of our specialness” we grant our species rights and privileges to factory farm 
our food, engage in vivisection and animal research, trawl the seafloor, and clear cut entire 
habitats of wildlife for our species’ sole benefit. Should our self-interest concede the suffering 
and killing of nonhumans? On what ethical basis have we situated ourselves in this place of 
moral privilege? Even the very definition of a species is highly variable and ardently contested 
by biologists and philosophers (Wilkins, 2009). If our specialness is an arbitrary invention, and 
there exists “a serious asymmetry of power and capacity between the creatures” (Nussbaum, 
2006, p. 22), then we need to rethink and deconstruct our anthropocentric worldview.  
 
In this paper I will argue that science education, with its mechanistic and “highly partial and 
reductionist” (Bonnett, 2009, p. 182) approach, promotes an intellectual dissociation and 
general desensitization to nonhumans. By flagging our specialness, we become separate from, 
rather than a part of, the Earth’s ecosphere. This places humans in a category unto themselves 
wherein we lose our “ecological literacy” (Cohen, 2007, p. 118). Forgetting and neglecting our 
symbiotic relations with other species supplants mutualism with a “union of the theoretical and 
empirical approaches to our natural environment” (White, 2004, p. 193) whereby utilitarian 
animal use and resource extraction benefits only the human party. When we lose our “ability to 
empathize and identify with nonhuman life” (Metzner, 1995, p. 61), we also lose our respect and 
humility for the mysteries of the natural world, resulting in scientific and economic gain being 
valued above social and environmental considerations. Science curricula rarely engages with the 
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ethics of science, often focused on how to experiment, dissect and atomize and rarely 
questioning if we should. Leopold (1949) asks the pertinent question: “Is education possibly a 
process of trading awareness for things of lesser worth?” (p. 18). We need to find a path toward 
holistic education—one that is experiential, embodied, and reciprocative—where ethics are part 
of the conversation before students use nonhuman animals in their learning and research. 
  
First I will elaborate on the self-interested, and sometimes arbitrary, fashion with which we 
approach animal use and the ethics therein, and how limiting moral rights to humans sanctions 
enormous nonhuman suffering. Next I will explore how our science pedagogy is embedded with 
anthropocentrism, and how teaching practices such as mandatory dissection assumes and 
reinforces the idea that nonhuman animals are devoid of moral status, or at least given lower 
moral status. Finally, I will outline a conceptual basis for moving toward Leopold’s (1949) 
ecocentrism, what Panikkar (1996) describes as “Peace with the Earth [that] excludes victory 
over the Earth, submission or exploitation of the Earth to our exclusive needs. It requires 
collaboration, synergy, a new awareness” (p. 57). 
 
The More-than-human Conversation 
As David Abram (1996) asks, “How did Western civilization become so estranged from 
nonhuman nature, so oblivious to the presence of other animals and the earth, that our current 
lifestyles and activities contribute daily to the destruction of whole ecosystems?” (p. 137). If 
utilitarianism strives to do the greatest good for the greatest number, this is clearly exercised 
with extreme prejudice from those who philosophized it into being (because the focus is on 
human good, and nothing but the human good). Thompson (1997) outlines how “ecological 
abuse [and] animal suffering [are problems] caused by the one-sidedness of a public sphere 
orientation that emphasizes self-advancement over relational responsibility” (p. 329–330). Our 
interactions with nonhumans resemble an asymmetrical marriage where one partner exploits 
and the other lacks any inherent rights. 
 
Nussbaum (2006) paraphrases Aristotle’s assertion thusly: “all animals are akin, in being made 
of organic materials; humans should not plume themselves on being special” (p. 348). The 
ecology of our existence is utterly dependent upon our relationship with the more-than-human 
world (Abram, 2011), and yet science has still to describe 75% of Earth’s animal and plant 
species. When we walk through the forests of the Pacific Northwest, more life (in terms of 
species number, biomass, and organic activity) exists beneath our feet than above. An old 
growth Douglas-fir has just as much mass invisible to our eyes as that which towers to the 
canopy overhead, while a single grass specimen boasts 14 billion root hairs that stretch 10,000 
kilometers (Luoma, 2006). Every step we take is on the back of 16,000 invertebrates (insects, 
millipedes, and roundworms among countless others) and each pinch of soil holds hundreds of 
millions of bacteria vital to the decomposition process without which the Earth would be a vast 
garbage dump of dead organisms many times over. The vast network of life hidden to our eyes, 
so easy to ignore, is what helps sustain biological life.  
 
By example, the tiny tardigrade (commonly called the water bear) is ubiquitous on our planet, 
estimated to be seven billion billion in number, yet many humans are unaware of their existence 
and the significant ecological role they play in myriad ecosystems. If a tardigrade could 
communicate with a human through the English language, perhaps a conversation on the topic 
of species specialness would sound something like this:  
 
Human: We humans can survive on every continent. 
Tardigrade: What about under the ocean? To us, hydrothermal vents are like Florida. 
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H: Er, we don’t do well in water for long periods. But we’ve been in space! 
T: You can survive in the vacuum of space? Me too! 
H: Not exactly, we need our spacesuits. What with the intense solar radiation, absolute 
zero temperatures, and utter lack of oxygen… 
T: Those don’t bother us much. We can go dormant for 10 years. Or even be put in 
boiling water. We’ll still reproduce! 
H: Okay, but where are your civilizations? 
T: There are a billion of us for every one of you. We’re fine with moss. 
H: We’ve changed the world to fit our needs. 
T: Oh, you’ve made more moss? 
H: No, no— 
T: More oxygen? Old growth forest? Increased biodiversity? A more hospitable climate? 
H: You’re missing the point. Hey, where are you, anyway? I can’t see you. 
T: Here, in this dew drop. Try putting me under a microscope. 
H: Okay…wait, you have eight legs? 
T: Four more limbs than you. 
H: You think that makes you superior? 
T: Only different. 
 
In order to use animals the way we do, we need to feel superior to them; put another way, we 
bestow virtues and morals to our species and omit them from others, consequently causing 
harm for our benefit. We have made ourselves into a pseudo-keystone species whose worth 
eclipses every other. This line of thinking is antithetical to holistic ecology science. 
 
Two important items should be addressed here. The first is that nonhuman animals obviously 
can’t speak English. There is strong evidence that some of the more complex mammalian 
species, such as dolphins and gorillas, do have a rudimentary form of language. Koko the gorilla 
has even been taught sign language, with a vocabulary of over one thousand words (Patterson, 
Tanner & Mayer, 1988). Yet such “language use is a frill, constructed by human scientists; 
[nonhuman primates’] own characteristic mode of flourishing in their own community does not 
rely on it” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 364). Secondly, nonhumans do not philosophize the way 
humans do, nor can they engage in a conversation on ethics. But this should not exclude them 
from some form of rights. After all, young children and the mentally disabled cannot articulate 
and understand ethics either.  
 
If being human confers moral status; that is, possessing the specific 23 sets of chromosomes that 
results in the phenotypic totality of what it means to be human—then it does not matter what 
genes and traits nonhumans possess. If intelligence, community living, and the ability to feel 
pain, empathize and express emotion (all qualities shown by nonhumans) do not confer moral 
status, is this not an utterly arbitrary distinction made at the genetic level? Our reliance upon 
other species gives us good reason to protect the more-than-human, a point I will return to later 
in this paper. 
 
Ecology and Ethics 
The word ecology, derived from the Greek oikos, means household or family. Every ecosystem is 
a home to intricately interconnected organisms, and since the first law of ecology is that 
“Everything is connected to everything else” (Commoner, 1971, p. 16), it stands to reason that 
humans are tied to many other organisms. However, the way we use the word animal suggests 
that we are referring to something other than human; that is, something less evolved or inferior 
in some way, all the while conveniently forgetting that humans hold membership to Kingdom 
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Animalia right alongside the lowly worm. “If life has a meaning only for the victors, only for 
those who ‘make it,’ we create an artificial hell for all the others” (Panikkar, 1996, p. 52). This 
artificial hell is justified because only humans fall under the moral umbrella. Yet the root of the 
word animal, anima, means breathing, soulful being; this suggests that an animal is a being 
endowed with spirit rather than a debased entity subordinate to humans.  
 
When Noddings (2002) asks the question, “If we have established a caring relation with one 
person at the cost of weakening a larger web of care, can we be said to have cared?” (p. 30) we 
can, in turn, extrapolate this to a larger, ecological context. In striving to care for one species, we 
weaken the larger web of organisms, and neglect to care for them—much, I will argue, to our 
own detriment.  
 
As Nussbaum (2006) points out, “We humans share a world and its scarce resources with other 
intelligent creatures” (p. 325), and such intelligence is adaptively unique to each species. “Our 
choices affect the lives of nonhuman species every day, and often cause them enormous 
suffering. Animals are not simply part of the furniture of the world; they are active beings trying 
to live their lives; and we often stand in their way” (p. 22). Our human animal needs come first, 
but at what cost? 
 
One of the most systematic sources of suffering perpetrated on nonhumans by humans is the 
raising and killing of livestock. Humans are heterotrophs; by our biology we must eat to survive. 
A vegan lifestyle limits this consumption to members outside of Kingdom Animalia. But for the 
sake of argument, let us say that a human must consume the meat of an animal in order to live a 
healthy life. In this case, the death of another animal is necessitated by our gastronomical need. 
Should we not raise these animals in such a way that their suffering is limited?  
 
Factory farmed chickens pumped full of growth hormone wading in their own feces, and pigs 
unable to turn around in their enclosures, never to touch grass or feel sunlight, seems utterly 
contrary to this notion. Yet millions of animals are kept and killed in such conditions every day, 
well hidden from the public eye. When we buy precut, preprocessed, prepackaged meat at the 
grocery store, we have removed ourselves from the suffering and blood that went into this 
plastic wrapped product. Panikkar (1996) describes how “The animal does not ‘kill,’ it eats. Man 
does not exploit when following Nature; it grows and evolves” (p. 57). Gary Snyder’s (Bromige et 
al., 1968) poem, “Song of the Taste,” (p. 359) eloquently elucidates upon this idea, 
 
Drawing on life of living 
     clustered points of light spun 
 out of space 
hidden in the grape.  
 
Eating each other’s seed 
 eating 
     ah, each other.  
 
Kissing the lover in the mouth of bread: 
 lip to lip. 
 
In this view, we can celebrate eating as an ecological act; but the way we eat needs to be ethically 
examined. What if each of us had to care for, grow, and slaughter our own animal food? The 
question I ask myself is, Could I kill, process and cook a chicken, goat, pig or cow in order to 
consume it? The answer for me is no, and I am therefore vegetarian. As long as we identify 
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nonhumans as beings who cannot suffer, and who have no moral rights, we will not care for 
their well-being. Epistemologically, we seem unable to see nonhuman animals as beings who are 
entitled to moral rights. This is partly convenience, partly prejudice, and partly how we are built: 
for the duration of the human species, we have used other animals in order to survive. Now, our 
survival may very well depend on monitoring, regulating, and curbing this exploitation of the 
more-than-human world.  
 
The use of animals in science teaching and research is another utility that benefits our species, 
obliging the suffering of another. Frogs and other vertebrates are dissected in North American 
classes as a matter of course, and while no reliable numbers are available, the existing data 
suggests that at least six million such animals (many wild caught, in the case of frogs) are used 
every year for dissection in USA high schools (Animalearn, 2012). Meanwhile, countless other 
nonhuman animals are experimented upon for medical research, the benefit of which is 
inestimable: our understanding of and treatments for heart disease, diabetes, epilepsy and a 
host of other conditions have improved dramatically (Americans for Medical Progress, n.d.). 
Therefore, the unfortunate pain and ending of nonhuman animal life is justified for the Homo 
sapiens’ good. Of course, there is a wide spectrum of animal uses in research, from cosmetics 
placed on the eyes of rabbits to rats used for cancer studies; the former, more easily categorized 
with vanity, is not as morally sound as the latter, whose results could produce a cure that saves 
millions of human lives annually.  
 
In science, model organisms are those that are easy and cheap to care for, and whose anatomy 
or behaviour is readily extrapolated to the human species. Studies on species that closely mimic 
our biology give more dependable and meaningful results for humans. For a moment, let us 
imagine a science-fiction scenario (remembering that science fiction is literature that is not true, 
but could theoretically be). If an alien species a thousand times more evolved than humans 
came to Earth, and found that humans possessed some key physiological quality that allowed 
them to experiment upon us to their great gain, would we object? I am certain that we would. 
Some may argue that both humans and these advanced aliens possess a quality—and thus a 
moral status—that separates us from the rest of animals, and so humans should still be exempt 
from being the subject of experimentation. The problem here is that humans (and the aliens in 
their case) decide to arbitrarily draw the line at their own species. Perhaps chimpanzees—or, for 
that matter, jellyfish—given the capability, would do the same. Such arbitrary delineation is 
based on subjective self-regard, and is morally dubious, as similar intraspecific arbitrary 
distinctions helped bring about slavery, cultural genocide of native peoples, and the Holocaust.  
 
Christian morality posits that humans are meant by God to dominate the world and use other 
species for human benefit. In a secular context, some ethicists maintain that humans have 
greater moral rights. Both are human-oriented perspectives founded on our consciousness and 
‘uniqueness’ granting us greater moral rights. Since, to the best of our knowledge, certain 
nonhuman animal species are sentient, able to feel pain, live in community, even laugh and cry, 
what trait can we use to separate Homo sapiens from the rest? The list becomes thin and 
capricious. As humans we have decided, by and large, that only humans possess moral status. If 
we are so special, so unique, and so privileged, how then can we justify the current genocide of 
the natural world? 
 
“What less often comes to mind…is the need to extend our theories of justice outside of the 
realm of the human, to address issues of justice involving nonhuman animals” (Nussbaum, 
2006, p. 21). For this to happen, humans would need to make innumerable sacrifices. If it is 
wrong that nonhuman animals suffer, and that millions die daily for our research and dietary 
needs, to recognize and halt this suffering would require a paradigm shift in terms of how 
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humans eat, teach, research and live their everyday lives. But if all of this suffering meant that 
your own child would be saved from a certain fatal disease, would you still side with the 
nonhumans? These are the kinds of difficult questions we need to ask. 
 
Why Care About Nonhumans? 
Ecological problems can overwhelm the progress made in the area of social justice. Historically 
speaking, western society has made only recent provisions to protect the rights of those long 
underprivileged. Equal rights for women, people of different ethnic backgrounds, the physically 
and mentally challenged, and the LBGTQ community are relatively new concepts for our species 
(and in most, if not all, of these cases systemic discrimination is still widely prevalent). 
Therefore, an argument could be made that we need to sort out the ethics and legalities of our 
own species first before attempting the same with nonhumans. However, this again 
conveniently limits our philosophical focus to ourselves. Regardless of whether or not 
nonhuman animals (or other organisms, for that matter) are given moral consideration, a strong 
(and vital) argument can be made for our dependency upon the other-than-human world. All of 
our basic necessities are derived from the natural world: food, shelter, clothing, energy, 
medicine, and that invisible and miraculous gas exhaled by leaves we call oxygen.  
 
Our planet’s biosphere houses 8.7 million species (Mora et al, 2011), excluding countless 
bacteria and viruses. Narrowing our focus to the human body, our best estimates indicate that 
we are composed of up to 100 trillion cells, and yet more than half of these are bacterial (Sender, 
Fuchs, & Milo, 2016). This means that the human ecosystem, shared with more than 40,000 
species, houses more nonhuman than human DNA, yet because this otherness does not appear 
to us in a way that we can consciously register, we cling onto an anthropocentric worldview. Our 
intimate connections with other forms for life should have us call into question what it means to 
be human and reevaluate the boundaries of human selfhood. By extension, we should care about 
nonhumans because, even though they are in one sense an other, in another, somewhat 
paradoxical sense, they are not separate from us.  
 
Finite resource extraction, habitat degradation, species extinction, climate change, essentially 
the cumulative pollution of land, water and sky calls for an urgent shift in cultural and 
ideological principles. Clearly humans can and do benefit by conserving and protecting the 
rights of other species. However, this should not preclude the idea that other species should be 
protected in their own right, an idea I will return to at the end of this paper.  
 
Speciesism and Our DNA 
If your pet dog is made to suffer, your moral outrage will be greater compared to a stray dog that 
has no such human association. One may argue that, similarly, if your brother is made to suffer 
you will be more outraged than if a homeless person is made to suffer. Both are true; the closer 
ties we have to a living organism, the greater our empathic connection, and thus the more we are 
affected by its suffering. However, speaking from the perspective of ethics, in both such cases 
the animal (whether canine or human) that has no direct relation to another human should be 
protected from suffering regardless. Pain and distress are not tolerable simply because they fail 
to be witnessed, nor are they permissible because it is a different species that suffers. Yet 
humans in general have a tendency to show more apathy and less compassion for those with 
which they are less familiar.  
 
Table 1. The genomic differences of Homo sapiens compared to other organisms (including 
other humans). The genomes of those organisms that have been sequenced are either edible or 
model organisms in scientific studies. Much of geneticists’ time and resources are spent 
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analyzing the genetic information of species that serve to benefit humankind. That is, our 
research path follows the utility. (Adapted from Pontius et al. 2007 and Zimmer, n.d.) 
 
 
Species 
Percentage 
difference in DNA 
from humans 
Human 0.5% 
Bonobo and chimpanzee 1.2% 
Gorilla 1.6% 
Orangutan 3.1% 
Cat 10% 
Dog 18% 
Cow 20% 
Fruit Fly and chicken 40% 
Wine grape 76% 
Baker’s yeast 82% 
 
 
While we might be reluctant to cause unnecessary harm to other primates, who differ only 
slightly in their DNA constitution, one would be hard pressed to find a human who shows any 
reluctance in how they use Baker’s yeast. Going up the rows in Table 1, we increase the 
likelihood of moral consideration as we move from plant, to livestock, to pets, and finally the 
apes. Even so, the owner of a golden retriever would be loath to inoculate their pet with HIV, 
while chimpanzees are the model species for such research.  
 
Based on the information in Table 1, we might claim that we will only experiment on those 
animals whose DNA differs from humans by at least 1.2%, which distinguishes us from our 
closest genetic relatives, the chimpanzee and bonobo; the former passes down learned skills to 
their young, while bonobos have shown creative musical ability (May, 2013)—both 
characteristics long thought to be strictly human. However, it is not genomic disparity that 
neglects the rights of others, but the fact that we classify someone as human that grants them 
special status not reserved for any other species. (In fact, not considering African Americans to 
be human ensured slaves did not need to be given their constitutional rights, explained away by 
declaring them “nonhuman” or “sub-human.”) 
 
Chimpanzees have been used in a plethora of psychological and medical experiments. Being our 
closest living relative, their bodies mimic our own better than any other species. The alternative 
viewpoint here is that, rather than treat our primate cousins the same way we treat an 
experimental rat (or yeast), we should grant them rights closer to our own. Since their suffering 
matters (and parallels human suffering closer than any other animal species), they should be 
considered moral agents. Something is ethically remiss when our closest genetic relatives, 
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possessing many human attributes such as language, community, and tool making, are made to 
suffer and die for our benefit.  
 
“Killing a mosquito,” Nussbaum (2006) contends, “is not the same sort of harm as killing a 
chimpanzee” (p. 359). Other primates possess sentience, the ability to make conscious choices, 
which is how Peter Singer (1975) argues for selective animal rights. He uses the example of a 
human with Down’s syndrome possessing fewer mental faculties than a bright chimpanzee. If 
we won’t experiment on a human with Down’s syndrome, we should also not experiment on a 
chimpanzee, as doing so is speciesism—that is, discrimination based on species.  
 
Nevertheless, suffering alone should be enough to consider the moral rights of nonhumans. If 
suffering matters, and if humans choose to cause suffering for nonhumans (to benefit Homo 
sapiens) in an arbitrary manner, we need to reevaluate how we think about and treat other-
than-human species, and consider the ramifications for education and curriculum. How can we 
embed an experiential learning model that inspires an ecocentric ethic? Within such a 
pedagogical system, how do we avoid speciesism and disrupt anthropocentrism? 
 
The Curriculum Connection 
Many scientific (and inherently atomistic) assumptions are deeply embedded in our curriculum. 
When a dead frog is placed in front of a biology student, the implicit statement is that this hour-
long lesson is more important than the life of this frog. Science as epistemology assumes, almost 
as a matter of course, that this animal is an object and its internal organs mechanisms to be 
atomized and studied. The frog becomes more object than organism, devoid of moral status. In 
this way, science education can construct nonhuman nature as inert and therefore not worthy of 
ethical consideration. 
 
Proponents of frog dissections may contend that dissection is hands-on, a literally visceral 
experience oft-remembered by students. In addition to discussing and relating organ systems to 
human anatomy, such a lesson can be interwoven with concepts of evolution (such as 
adaptations linked to leg and tongue length) and ecology (such as habitat and ecological niches). 
One might also argue that dissection can inspire future surgeons or veterinarians to pursue such 
careers. Further, there is an enormous invasive American bullfrog population that needs to be 
stymied (Louette, Devisscher, & Adriaens, 2014); catching such amphibians in order to remove 
them from non-indigenous areas and providing these specimens to be used in dissections makes 
good use of an ecological problem.  
 
However, such reasoning does not, in itself, justify the killing of these animals. None of these 
reasons address the underlying issue of engaging the world through a human-centered lens, and 
therefore enabling the arbitrary suffering of nonhumans. The problem goes deeper than what 
students can learn from dissections. We need to address the hidden curriculum and unspoken 
presumptions that happen as a result of mandatory dissections. Dissection invariably moulds 
the young minds of students given scalpels as tools. 
 
While science does follow its own set of ethics—an unbiased and honest approach with 
responsible results that get peer-reviewed—the use of animals is a given in the biological 
sciences. Bioethics is a discipline concerned with the ethics of science, yet while we may be 
persuaded to be efficient in our use of animals (Festing et al., 2002), such use is, in many ways, 
the backbone of biology. In order to study life, we experiment upon and dissect nonhuman life.  
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When dissections happen, the specimen is already dead and located in a sterile (e.g., not its 
natural) environment. By negating choice, that is, “by [our] silence on the subject” (Martin, 
1981, p. 107) this impresses (or even imposes) a certain moral viewpoint on students. One 
wonders how many biology students graduate without a single “worry about the uses to which 
[science] is put” (p. 104). More broadly, educators often neglect to “investigate the particularly 
acute and very challenging value questions that arise in relation to hidden curricula of all kinds” 
(p. 108).  
 
Goethe expressed concern that 
  
to break phenomena down into discrete elements or units is to drain them of life. 
Life resides in wholes: when organisms are taken apart they are no longer alive. 
In order to understand, and hence engage with, the aliveness of nature, we have 
to understand it in terms of its wholeness. (Mathews, 2008, p. 60)  
 
The frog is more than the sum of its parts. The fact the animal is dead omits a significant—and 
imperative—part of the lesson. Ecology has a lot to teach the other sciences: the interrelatedness 
of all things is a pertinent concept to shift our worldview toward a more holistic, ecological 
perspective. Many scientists have deep moral concerns for the nonhuman members of the 
biosphere, yet all too often this concern arises from an anthropocentric perspective.  
 
How can we approach frog dissections differently? A number of options are available, including 
(1) giving students the choice to dissect or not. This can include a discussion prior focused on 
the benefits and drawbacks of dissection, as well as the available alternatives (such as models 
and online dissections). (2) Moving the classroom outside into a place-based learning 
environment, where frogs are part of the ecosystem. One can imagine a very different lesson 
being taught by those students given a dead frog and a scalpel, and those who discover this 
living and breathing amphibian in its own environment. The former focuses on anatomy and 
physiology, the latter on ecology and habitat, shifting from anthropocentric to ecocentric 
attitudes. (3) Widening our scope, ethics and a sense of social responsibility can be interwoven 
with many, if not all, lessons. This helps undermine intrinsic speciesist assumptions about what 
and how we learn. Of course, the above options are dependent upon the age group of learners, 
available technology, and access to wetland habitat. But with computers being ubiquitous at 
schools, and online simulations getting more and more sophisticated, dissection alternatives 
have never been closer to the real thing. 
 
Situations may exist where dissection is ethically defensible. If animal specimens, dead of 
natural causes, are found in their native environment by students, this gives learners an 
ecological context. Further, the gathering, preparation, dissection and cleanup of the 
specimen(s) would be carried out respectfully, with a reverence and gratitude for this 
opportunity, with students involved and giving input at every step.  
 
Looking Forward to an Ecocentric Education 
This paper has primarily focused on human and nonhuman animal ethics. However, a case is 
increasingly made for extending ethical consideration not only for all living things, but for 
inanimate objects as well (Curry, 2011). This is the realm of deep ecology, and although I do not 
have room to explore this fully, I feel that a brief glimpse at the path ahead is pertinent.  
 
When economic gain consistently trumps environmental ethics, the importance of nature and 
ecology is overlooked. As Leopold (1949) so clearly prophesied more than half a century ago, 
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“our bigger-and-better society is now like a hypochondriac, so obsessed with its own economic 
health as to have lost the capacity to remain healthy” (p. ix). Panikkar (1996) contends that, “To 
have to pay for water, food—and soon even air—is a sign of a sick culture” (p. 51). Given that 
each human is a “knot in a net of relationships,” (p. 55), and since “Aristotelians argued that all 
of nature is a continuum, and that all living creatures are worthy of respect and even wonder” 
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 328), only an ecocentric worldview can help establish such respect and 
wonder for the more-than-human. 
 
We need what Mathews (2008) calls,  
a creative co-action, a form of co-action that might be termed synergy [which is] 
any form of intentional interactivity between two or more parties who engage 
with each other in such a way that something new and larger than either of them, 
but true to the inner principle of each, is created. (p. 48) 
 
I would argue that the human body, as a living and breathing ecosystem containing trillions of 
bacteria, fungi, protists, and tiny animals, is such a synergy. Our own welfare is tied to the 
flourishing of many ecosystems containing both animate and inanimate members; we thus have 
ethical obligations to entire ecosystems, up to and including the entire planetary oikos. 
Mathews’ synergy concept would enable the import of ecological concerns to move toward the 
forefront of human thought and progress, and to see “our beliefs as living convictions rather 
than dogmatic formulae” (Callan, 1995, p. 30). 
 
Synergy and deep ecology move us from exclusively biotic morality toward a more inclusive 
abiotic morality. “Every natural being is a living cell forming part of a whole and mirroring the 
whole at the same time. Not only animals and plants are alive, so are mountains and rocks” 
(Panikkar, 1996, p. 56). Taken this way, even the inorganic elements of the biosphere, from 
rivers and oceans to minerals and earth, become worthy of moral consideration.  
 
The classroom, as the site of learning, has a pivotal role to play here. Sitting in rows with the 
authority figure in front sets the stage for learners to be passive and attentive. Learning begins 
when the first bell rings, and pauses when the recess bell goes off. Prescriptive lesson plans keep 
surprise and spontaneity to a minimum. Everything is neatly contained in one room. Contrast 
this with an outdoor classroom, and the conditions dramatically shift. Control is traded for 
stimuli, walls for sensorial experience, desks for embodiment, moving toward “embodied 
teaching and learning wherein the whole personality and life of the teacher and learner are 
involved” (Bai, 2006, p. 17).  
 
Student curiosity is further engaged and the unexpected (whether in the form of clouds, rain, 
ants, birds or myriad other natural phenomena) gets incorporated into the curriculum of the 
day. Lessons have a greater potential to become interdisciplinary, cross-pollinating across 
subjects. While student`s can benefit from the increased movement and participation of 
learning outdoors, recent evidence suggests that educators who teach outdoors develop 
innovative teaching strategies, in addition to bolstering their confidence and enthusiasm for 
their work (King’s College London, 2011). Pedagogy needs to involve the creation and 
maintenance of a moral climate of care, respect, sensitivity, and compassion whereby class 
members become more attuned to and connected with all those who are other (Bai, Cohen & 
Scott, 2013; Cohen & Bai, 2012). 
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“That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and 
respected is an extension of ethics” (Leopold, 1949, p. viii–ix). Can we learn to love and respect 
what we treat as mere commodities? Further, we must protect and care for entire ecologies 
based on our recognition that we are inextricably connected to them; their welfare and 
flourishing is our own. The long trodden road of anthropocentrism leads us to protect a salmon 
species—but not the river they swim, feed, mate and nest within. A world where rivers are 
treated with wonder and respect is also a world where students learn outdoors through an 
ecocentric lens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SFU	Ed	Review,	2016		
	Beavington,	Curriculum	Hidden	 13		
References 
 
Abram, D. (1996). Spell of the sensuous: Perception and language in a more-than-human 
world. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Abram, D. (2011). Becoming animal: An earthly cosmology. Toronto, ON: Random House of 
Canada. 
 
Americans for Medical Progress. (n.d.). Animal research benefits: Animal research means 
medical progress. Retrieved from https://www.amprogress.org/animal-research-
benefits 
 
Animalearn. (2012). Frequently asked questions: How many animals are dissected every year? 
Retrieved from http://www.animalearn.org/faq.php#.VSqp1EvdJ_u 
 
Bai, H. (2006). Philosophy for education: Towards human agency. Paideusis 15(1), 7–19. 
 
Bai, H., Cohen, A., & Scott, C. (2013). Re-visioning higher education: The three-fold relationality 
framework. In J. Lin, R. Oxford & E. Brantmeier (Eds.), Re-envisioning higher 
education: Embodied paths to wisdom and social transformation, Charlotte: 
Information Age Publishing. 
 
Bromige, D., Eigner, L., Langland, J., Sandeen, E., Snyder, G., Sorrentino, G., Stafford, W. E., & 
Stefanile, F. N. (1968). Poetry 111(6): 359. 
 
Callan, E. (1995). Virtue, dialogue, and the common school. American Journal of Education 
104(1), 1–33. 
 
Cobb, E. (1977). The ecology and imagination in childhood. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Cohen, M. J. (2007). Reconnecting with nature: Finding wellness through restoring your bond 
with the Earth. Lakeville, MN: Ecopress. 
 
Cohen, A. & Bai, H. (2012). Minding what really matters: Relationship as teacher. In Chambers, 
C. Hasebe-Ludt, E. Sinner, A. & Leggo, C. (Eds.), A heart of wisdom: Life writing as 
empathic inquiry (pp. 257-266). New York, NY: Peter Lang. 
 
Commoner, B. (1971). The closing circle: Nature, man, and technology. New York, NY: Bantam 
Books. 
 
Curry, P. (2011). Ecological ethics. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
 
Festing, M. F. W., Overend, P., Gaines Das, R., Cortina-Borja, M., & Berdoy, M. (2002). The 
design of animal experiments: Reducing the use of animals in research through better 
experimental design. London: The Royal Society of Medicine Press Limited. 
 
King’s College London. (2011). “Understanding the diverse benefits of learning in natural 
environments.” Retrieved from http://www.lotc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/KCL-LINE-benefits-final-version.pdf 
 
SFU	Ed	Review,	2016		
	Beavington,	Curriculum	Hidden	 14		
Leopold, A. (1949). A sand county almanac and sketches here and there. Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Louette, G., Devisscher, S., & Adriaens, T. (2014). Combating adult invasive American bullfrog 
Lithobates catesbeianus. European Journal of Wildlife Research 60(4), 703–706. 
 
Luoma, J. R. (2006). The hidden forest: Biography of an ecosystem. Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University Press.   
 
Martin, J. R. (1981). The ideal of the educated person. Educational Theory 31(2), 97–109.  
 
Mathews, F. (2008). Thinking from within the calyx of nature. Environmental Values 17, 41–65. 
 
May, K. T. (2013, Feb. 28). The interspecies internet: Diana Reiss, Peter Gabriel, Neil 
Gershenfeld and Vint Cerf at TED2013. Retrieved from 
http://blog.ted.com/2013/02/28/the-interspecies-internet-diana-reiss-peter-gabriel-
neil-gershenfeld-and-vint-cerf-at-ted2013/ 
 
Metzner, R. (1995). The psychopathology of the human-nature relationship. In T. Roszak, M. E. 
Gomes & A. D. Kanner (Eds.), Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, healing the mind 
(pp. 55–67). San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books. 
 
Mora, C., Tittensor, D. P., Adl, S., Simpson, A. G. B., & Worm, B. (2011, August). How many 
species are there on Earth and in the ocean? PLOS Biology. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pbio.1001127 
 
Noddings, N. (2002). Starting at home: Caring and social policy. Los Angeles, CA: University 
of California Press. 
 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2006). Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership. 
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press. 
 
Panikkar, R. (1992). A nonary of priorities. Interculture, XXIX(1), 48–58. 
 
Patterson, F., Tanner, J., & Mayer, N. (1988). Pragmatic analysis of gorilla utterances: Early 
communicative development in the gorilla Koko. Journal of Pragmatics 12(1), 35–54. 
 
Pollan, M. (2013). Cooked: A natural history of transformation. New York, New York: Penguin 
Books. 
 
Pontius, J. U., Mullikin, J. C., Smith, D. R., Agencourt Sequencing Team, Lindblad-Toh, K., 
Gnerre, S., Clamp, M., Chang, J., Stephens, R., Neelam, B., Volfovsky, N., Schäffer, A. A., 
Agarwala, R., Narfström, K., Murphy, W. J., Giger, U., Roca1, A. L., Antunes, A., 
Menotti-Raymond, M., Yuhki, N., Pecon-Slattery, J., Johnson, W. E., Bourque, G., 
Tesler, G, NISC Comparative Sequencing Program, & O’Brien, S.J. (2007). Initial 
sequence and comparative analysis of the cat genome.   Genome Research 17, 1675–
1689. 
 
Sender, R., Fuchs, S., & Milo, R. (2016). Revised estimates for the number of human and 
bacteria cells in the body. bioRxiv. Advance online publication. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/036103  
SFU	Ed	Review,	2016		
	Beavington,	Curriculum	Hidden	 15		
 
Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation. New York, NY: HarperCollins. 
 
White, L. (2004). The historical roots of our ecological crisis. In R. S. Cottlieb (Ed.), This sacred 
Earth: Religion, nature, environment, 2nd ed. (pp. 192–201). New York: Routledge. 
 
Wilkins, J. S. (2009). Species: A history of the idea. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Zimmer, C. (n.d.). Genes Are Us. And Them. National Geographic. Retrieved from 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/07/125-explore/shared-genes 
 
 
